We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining … positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive …

We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining … positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive … results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games. -- Inner Core ; Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution ; Competitive …

We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining … positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive …

it as a two-stage game: A first stage of simultaneous 1-to-1 matching between firms and managers and a second stage of … each firm-manager pair to expect that the remaining agents will form a positive assortative matching (PAM), and the PAM on … the grand market is a stable matching under rational expectations. Even if they are strategic substitutes yet the …

We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors … and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they …

We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors … and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they …

We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non- transferable utility (NTU) and its … subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This … large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed …

We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non- transferable utility (NTU) and its … subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This … large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed …

We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors … and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they … theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases. -- Market Games ; Competitive Payoffs ; Core …

We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its … subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This … large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed …