We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and the legal sector. Then …, using a detailed survey of law school graduates, we explore why firms use long-term compensation. We find that individuals … employer to tasks that are self-enhancing are more likely to receive long-term compensation, especially in markets with high …

We explore the determinants of compensation gaps between a firm's CEO and its other top executives, and compare the … ability of two competing optimal contracting theories, namely tournament theory and productivity theory, to explain the cross … sectional variability in these gaps across firms. We find little evidence that firms design their executive compensation …

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has … sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the … result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …

Deregulation and managerial compensation are two important topics on the political and academic agenda. The former has … their executives, the analysis of the effects of competition on the structure of compensation may be informative for policy …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

We analyze competition through incentive contracts for managers in duopoly. Privately informed managers exert surplus … managerial compensations between efficient and inefficient managers. In the second case, as with large contractual spillovers …

both firm-level profits and managers' compensation. Consequently, managers' incentives are positively correlated with firm … provide to their managers. A central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry, which implies that …

This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear … combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament … against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric …