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On the incentive effects of sample size in monitoring agents : a theoretical and experimental analysis
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov; Uske, … - In: German economic review 18 (2017) 1, pp. 81-98
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011722094
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Winning by losing : incentive incompatibility in multiple qualifiers
Dagaev, Dmitry; Sonin, Konstantin - In: Journal of sports economics 19 (2018) 8, pp. 1122-1146
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943429
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Incentives and managerial effort under competitive pressure : an experiment
Ennasri, Ahmed; Willinger, Marc - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 68 (2014) 4, pp. 324-337
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510306
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Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives
Bian, Junsong; Lai, Kin Keung; Hua, Zhongsheng - In: Economics letters 118 (2013) 1, pp. 97-100
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706863
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie - 2014
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960
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On reputational rents as an incentive mechanism in competitive markets
Vial, Bernardita; Zurita, Felipe - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009236672
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A strategic analysis of incorporating CSR into managerial incentive design
Bian, Junsong; Li, Kevin W.; Guo, Xiaolei - In: Transportation research / E : an international journal 86 (2016), pp. 83-93
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446611
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942
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Optimal incentive schemes in multiagent situations
Mookherjee, Dilip - 1982
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002496816
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Managerial incentives, corruption, and the internet : essays on moral hazard
Thiele, Henrik - 2000 - Als Ms. gedr.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001472780