This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly...

This paper experimentally tests the relation between subjects' competitiveness and bargaining behavior. Bargaining is investigated in a demand-ultimatum game, where the responder can request a share of the pie from the proposer. The results show that highly competitive proposers earn less, since...

In this paper, we investigate individuals' investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We...

This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly...

This paper experimentally tests the relation between subjects' competitiveness and bargaining behavior. Bargaining is investigated in a demand-ultimatum game, where the responder can request a share of the pie from the proposer. The results show that highly competitive proposers earn less, since...