This paper examines the role of status acquisition as a motive for giving in voluntary contributions to public goods. In particular, every donor's status is given by the difference between his contribution and that of the other donor. Specifically, I show that contributors give more than in...

We study contests as an example of winner-take-all competition with linearly ordered large strategy space. We study a model in which each player optimizes the probability of winning above some subjective threshold. The environment we consider is that of limited information where agents play the...

This paper empirically analyzes how performance feedback and information on heterogeneity affect behavior in dynamic contests, using data on two-player-contests from a smartphone/tablet application called ``Wordblitz for Friends''. We find that players increase output as underdogs and decrease...

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...

A general framework for games of competition as an extension of the 'War of Attrition' game is investigated, where different forms of competitive strategies are introduced in classroom experiments. The games are classroom simulations of real life competition where firms must compete in prices,...