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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009714131
Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team's performance and therefore on their colleagues' productivity. We study the...
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We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003784391
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831629
IZA DP No. 2927 Competition, Cooperation, and Corporate Culture Michael Kosfeld Ferdinand von Siemens DISCUSSION P APER SERIES Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor July 2007 Competition, Cooperation, and Corporate Culture Michael Kosfeld...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004926696
We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276699
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276700
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763924