The psychology literature provides ample evidence that people have difficulties taking the perspective of less-informed others. This paper presents a controlled experiment showing that this "curse of knowledge" can cause comparative overconfidence and overentry into competition. In a broader...

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...

This study investigates experimentally the disclosure of verifiable information in settings with and without seller competition. Sellers often choose to report a selected set of information and buyers account for this – even though not fully – by bidding skeptically. As expected, competition...

In classical models of markets, the state of nature is revealed regardless of the actions agents take. If instead agents can uncover information they will determine which states can be distinguished and thus which goods are traded. Competitive equilibria can then be inefficient. One source of...

We study price discrimination in a market in which two firms engage in Bertrand competition. Some consumers are contested by both firms, and other consumers are “captive” to one of the firms. The market can be divided into segments, which have different relative shares of captive and...

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about the qualities of their respective proposals, which are positively correlated. The information externality -- that the news disclosed by one sender...

We consider a large rational expectations economy built on Han and Yang (2013) where traders can share information with each other via an information network and investigate the impact of network connectedness on market equilibrium outcomes. We find that in the equilibrium with endogenous...

In this paper, we present a simple model of information provision in competitive markets. We depart from previous literature in that we allow firms to choose both prices and information revelation policies. Under the assumption that the underlying state is binary, we show that in the unique...