We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities … equilibrium corruption in two different settings: 1) Each bureaucrat maximizes his own individual utility (competitive corruption …); 2) An illegal syndicate maximizes total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal …

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities … equilibrium corruption in two different settings: 1) Each bureaucrat maximizes his own individual utility (competitive corruption …); 2) An illegal syndicate maximizes total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal …

We test the effectiveness of an anti-corruption policy that is often discussed among practitioners: an increase in … jurisdictions reduces extortionary corruption, i.e., bribe demands for the provision of services that clients are entitled to … able to assess whether increasing competition reduces extortionary corruption. We find that, if search costs are unaffected …