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motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487682
This paper analyzes intertemporal effort provision in two-stage tournaments. A principal with a fixed budget for prizes faces two risk-neutral agents. He observes noisy signals of effort in both periods. His goal is to maximize either total efforts (perfect substitutes) or the product of first-...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338948
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009245338
We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295655
I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115304
We examine the properties of all-pay contests in the spirit of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) as the number of entrants grows large under organizer objectives of expected and expected maximum outcomes. Unlike the case with a small number of entrants, with a large number of entrants a single prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835938
In this paper, we allow budget-augmenting negative prizes in all-pay auctions with incomplete information, which in general entail endogenous participation of contestants, and investigate effort-maximizing rank-order-based prize allocation rule. We find that at the optimum, the adoption of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838160
This paper generalizes the results of Siegel (2009, 2010) to accommodate performance spillovers. More precisely, we show that, if for any player, spillover from other players' performance is independent of his own performance, and if the spillover enters any player's payoff in an additively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979419
This paper studies complete-information, all-pay contests with asymmetric players competing for heterogeneous prizes. In these contests, each player chooses a performance level or "score". The first prize is awarded to the player with the highest score, the second -- less valuable -- prize to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026559
This note studies contests in which multiple participants compete for two distinct prizes. The participants have distinct constant marginal costs, which are commonly known. We show that the contests have a unique Nash equilibrium, and we characterize the equilibrium payoffs and strategies in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012991889