We develop models of markets with procrastinating consumers where competition operates - or is supposed to operate - both through the initial selection of providers and through the possibility of switching providers. As in other work, consumers fail to switch to better options after signing up...

I consider a situation in which workers have present-biased preferences and tend to procrastinate their tasks, but underestimate the degree of self-control prob- lems that they will face in the future. Brocas and Carrillo (2001) show that a form of competition always mitigates delay in a setting...

We show that in multi-sector optimal growth models, where the technology satisfies a simple reachability condition, infinite horizon programs which satisfy the competitive conditions are optimal. We provide examples of a variety of production models where the reachability condition is satisfied....

Laboratory experiments involving a real effort task are conducted to examine the importance of gender differences in competition aversion for generating gender wage gaps. Cross-subject design treatment and control experiments suggest that gender differences in risk aversion play no significant...

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the...

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...