We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...

We run a market experiment where firms can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers. They are faced with artificial demand from consumers who make mistakes when assessing the net value of products on the market. If some offers are comparable however, some...

This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower...

Electronic coordination links markets at different locations that have initially been (partially) separated by transport costs. Rising competitive pressure should in turn affect incentives to differentiate products. In this paper investment decisions concerning transport cost reduction and...

The related phenomena of learning curve and network effects are quite common in oligopolistic markets. In this context the present paper discusses the incentives of a technological leader to share its exclusive technology with potential competitors. An alliance may be preferable because partner...

In this paper we show that a homogeneous-product market with multiple Bertrand equilibria becomes a market with a single Bertrand equilibrium when we introduce a small degree of product differentiation. When differentiation tends to zero, that Bertrand equilibrium converges to the unique...

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete a la Cournot, then they are able to sustain quot;collusivequot; outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By...

We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He may face competition by an entrant in the applications market. The platform monopolist can benefit from competition for three reasons. First, his profits from the platform...

The present paper is concerned with providing a core model to address the issue of firms simultaneously competing in both prices and quantities (capacity levels) within a simple duopoly market setting where products are asymmetrically differentiated by endogenous quality location. A three-stage...