Competing hospitals may not only use quality of service to attract patients but also their specialization profile. Applying a Hotelling-duopoly and interpreting respectively quality and specialization as vertical and horizontal differentiation, we analyze the optimal allocation in both...

This article investigates the potential for regulatory competition within the legal framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). By comparing the legal structures of the EU and the EEU, this article outlines the ways in which regulatory competition is embedded in each of the legal frameworks...

This paper studies the effect of two regulatory instruments - a price cap and a reference price system - a mandatory substitution rule, and the combination of both on generic competition in a Salop-type model with an off-patent brand-name drug and n differentiated generic versions. The price cap...

We study the equilibrium and its stability property in a duopoly market in which minimum quality standards (MQS) are set, prices are regulated with links to product quality, and firms compete in quality. The adjustment dynamics are taken into account. We focus on the role that MQS play, in...

Canada's Patented Medicines (Notice Of Compliance) Regulations fail to achieve the intended purpose of balancing innovation with timely generic market entry. An examination of the inefficiencies created by the Canadian regulations reveals that key features of U.S. pharmaceutical law should be...

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering both the effect of (i) introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and (ii) increasing competition through lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number...

This paper studies redistributional effects of competition between private and public insurance on health insurance markets based on the example of Germany. Health insurance is provided by a budget-balancing public insurance and a revenue-maximizing private insurance; customers are characterized...