Do firms seek to make the market transparent,or do they confuse the consumers in their product perceptions? We show that the answer to this question depends decisively on preference heterogeneity. Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, confusion is not necessarily an equilibrium...

We study targeted information in a duopoly model with differentiated products, allowing for consumers with limited attention. The presence of inattentive consumers incentivizes firms to behave as if they were mass-advertisers, despite their ability to direct their messages precisely towards...

We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests, Lazear-Rosen tournaments and all-pay contests as special cases, among others. We show that the optimal contest has an...

We present a model of startup acquisitions, which may give rise to inefficient "talent hoarding." We develop a model with two competing firms that can acquire and integrate (or "acquihire") a startup operating in an orthogonal market. Such an acquihire improves the competitiveness of the...