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This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that …
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Decentralizing the allocation of public goods by giving funds directly to communities takes advantage of local information concerning needs, but decreases the accountability over how funds are used; leaving funds open to misuse or capture by local elites. In Indonesia, the World Bank attempts to...
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In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...
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accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when … competition on corruption. We show that in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral competition. If the … election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher …
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