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Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936799
This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576711
Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517
We use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of disclosing the number of active participants in contests with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898874
This paper studies optimal information disclosure in competing contests with identical players. Each player faces a capacity constraint on the total effort contribution and is ex ante uninformed about the difficulty of the task to be performed in one of the contests. The task can be either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212097
We study the incentives of players to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a rent-seeking contest. We show that information sharing can arise in equilibrium if types are concentrated enough, whereas sharing information is strictly dominated if types are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956214
I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest designer. While different objectives involve different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869576
This paper proposes a tractable model of a dynamic contest where players have private information about the contest's prize. We show that private information helps to encourage players who have fallen behind, leading to an increase in aggregate incentives. We derive the optimal information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318681
We study signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous players. A privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals of known types. The type of future rivals determines which signal the challenger wants to produce, whereas the strategic response of current rivals determines the extent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013292789
I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463788