We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. The main qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by …We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of …

We develop a model of college assignment as a large contest wherein students with heterogeneous abilities compete for … approximate the outcomes of a game with large, but finite, sets of colleges and students. By incorporating two common families of …

This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South … about students that is of common interest to all colleges, lower-ranked colleges can gain in competition with higher …