This paper analyzes price collusion in a repeated game with two submarkets; a standard and a premium quality segment. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket...

Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient...

Die Untersuchung beginnt mit einem allgemeinen Teil. Dieser führt in die Problematik der Internalisierung externer Kosten allgemein und speziell im Abfallbereich ein und umreißt das Spannungsfeld, in dem sich Handeslunternehmen aufgrund der aktuellen Umweltpolitik und -gesetzgebung befinden....

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups. Two cases are analyzed: (i) Best-response symmetries so that profits in the static Nash...