We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

on firms' price setting behavior in a 2x2 factorial design experiment with and without communication and under present … which correlate with market outcomes and communication's effectiveness. The results have implications for antitrust policy …

as a main factor causing collusive product markets. -- buyer groups ; cartels ; collusion ; communication ; experiments …We explore whether buyer groups, in which firms legally purchase inputs jointly, facilitate collusion in the product … credible threats, hence, in theory buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments in a three …

. -- cartels ; collusion ; communication ; experiments ; repeated games …We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation …

experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to …Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion … tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain …

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized … information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …