We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

Deltas, Salvo and Vasconcelos (2011) develop a model of geographically separated markets with differentiated goods in which collusion (or merger to monopoly), by restricting trade relative to duopolistic competition, is beneficial for society and can be beneficial for consumers. In this chapter,...

This on-line casebook examines the fields of international antitrust and international trade law. In general, it examines how the United States and other jurisdictions regulate competition among firms which do business abroad. This will include how competition policy regulates individuals and...

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring pro-competitive effects and a competitive limit, and investigate the impact of trade on welfare and efficiency. Contrary to the constant elasticity case, in which all gains from trade are due to product diversity, our...

This paper examines social welfare effects of antitrust regulation in the presence of strategic trade policy within a reciprocal market model. Using a simple two-country trade model, we show that the enforcement of antitrust policy in the domestic market unambiguously improves the domestic...

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

Governments in several countries have recently spent considerable effort to defend domestic firms against acquisition attempts from abroad and instead favoured mergers among national firms. In this paper we offer an explanation why globalization can reinforce the case for promoting national...

The answer to the question in the title is yes for the case of ad-valorem taxes, a foreign industry that produces a vertically differentiated good of higher quality, and costs that take the form of qualitydependent fixed costs for both the foreign and domestic firm. The domestic industry loses...