distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …

This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the … deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of the law …; 5) independence; and 6) separation of power. We then discuss how to measure deterrence. We review the literature that …

, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where …

, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where …

This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the … deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of the law …; 5) independence; and 6) separation of power. We then discuss how to measure deterrence. We review the literature that …

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our … empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 … deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0 …

distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …