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Interactions across firms and bid rigging

Bergman, Mats A.; Lundberg, Johan; Lundberg, Sofia; … - In: Review of industrial organization 56 (2020) 1, pp. 107-130

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012231111

On cartel detection and Moran's I

Lundberg, Johan - In: Letters in spatial and resource sciences : LSRS 10 (2017) 1, pp. 129-139

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689671

Leniency program : a new tool in competition policy to deter cartel activity in procurement auctions

Brisset, Karine; Thomas, Lionel - In: European journal of law and economics 17 (2004) 1, pp. 5-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001891058

On market power and cartel detection : the South African flour cartel

Mncube, Liberty - In: Tydskrif vir studies in ekonomie en ekonometrie : SEE 37 (2013) 3, pp. 41-59

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010248301

Empirical methods in the analysis of collusion

Paha, Johannes - 2010

are descriptive but need not be universally valid. This paper opens up the black box called econometrics for competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008758896

Going once, going twice, reported! : Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - In: European economic review : EER 70 (2014), pp. 317-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010498841

[Rezension von: Weishaar, Stefan E., Cartels, competition and public procurement, law and economic approaches to bid rigging ]

Pinto, Brijesh P.; Williams, Michael A. - In: Journal of economic literature 52 (2014) 2, pp. 548-549

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479071

Fighting collusion : an implementation theory approach

Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter - 2021

A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309

Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws : How Leniency Programs Solve Bertrand's Paradox and Enforce Collusion in Auctions

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2003

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate" leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151044

Collusion in the Presence of Antitrust Prosecution : Experimental Evidence

Gerlach, Heiko A.; Li, Junqian - 2022

We conduct an experimental study of cartel behaviour in the presence of an active competition authority that may … of potential antitrust prosecution tends to improve the internal functioning of cartels. Cartel stability is … significantly higher and punishment weaker in the treatments with active cartel detection relative to the treatment where cartels …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237834

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