Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...

This article discusses the approaches of the European Union (EU) and of the United States (US) to the notions of agreement and concerted practice applied to horizontal collusive consequences of vertical restraints. I conclude that networks of vertical restraints blur the differences between...

This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives. A rigorous...

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it seeks to contribute to a more fine-grained comparison between US antitrust and EU competition law by (selectively) including state antitrust laws as well as laws that pursue objectives different from the antitrust laws but interfere with the aims of...

This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives. A rigorous...

We explore the implications of the widely accepted understanding that competition law is common — or “judge-made” — law. Specifically, we ask how the rule of reason in antitrust law should be shaped and implemented, not just to guide correct application of existing law to the facts of a...

We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature witha view toward competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition canemerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underlinethe role of dynamics, but also of platform...

Patent licensing contracts commonly prohibit licensees from challenging the validity of the patents at the basis of the contract or penalize such challenges. A considerable debate has emerged as to whether courts should enforce these challenge clauses. We argue that this debate has not gone far...

Conventional wisdom presumes that a supplier in a monopolistic market, or in an oligopolistic market that is not perfectly competitive, has the power to charge a supra-competitive wholesale price. In contrast, elaborating on recent economics studies, this Article shows that the supplier of an...