We submit these comments to the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice in their review of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The Agencies ask, in Question 8: “Should the Guidelines be revised to explain more fully than in the current §1.521 how market shares and market...

The following is a compilation of short book reviews I have prepared over the past two years for the World Competition Law & Economics Review or the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law website. In one case, the book discussed was published in 2010,...

Non-discriminatory third-party access to transportation infrastructures in electricity - transmission and distribution networks - is essential for open and effective competition in wholesale and retail electricity markets. Competition in wholesale energy markets is possible and desirable as it...

The present study analyzes the current level of progress in introducing a regional competition law and policy that would create a level playing field for the businesses within the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). It is specifically focused on the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which dominate...

We present a model of a market failure based on a requirement provision by digital platforms in the acquisition of personal information from users of other products/services. We establish the economic harm from the market failure and the requirement using traditional antitrust methodology....

This paper analyses the role of the European Commission in taking cases of abuse of dominance in the telecommunications sector since its liberalisation in 1998. The argument is that the Commission has played a very active antitrust role, in particular at the beginning of the liberalisation, and...

The digitisation of existing business models and the new way of doing business of digital platforms pose new challenges both to the performance of companies in the market and to the lives of consumers and users. The dominant digital companies are all American (Google, Facebook, Amazon, and...

Dominant digital platforms such as Google and Facebook collect personal information of users by default precipitating a market failure in the market for personal information. We establish the economic harms from the market failure. We discuss conditions for eliminating the market failure and...