Computational antitrust promises not only to help antitrust agencies preside over increasingly complex and dynamic markets, but also to provide companies with the tools to assess and enforce compliance with antitrust laws. If research in the space has been primarily dedicated to supporting...

Hong Kong has only had cross-sector competition law since 2015, but the city’s telecommunications markets have been subject to sector-specific antitrust provisions for over two decades. The importance of nurturing an efficient, innovative, and competitive telecoms industry for Hong Kong’s...

Antitrust has been doubly disempowered: we can no longer effectively regulate corporate power and many forms of corporate power are now irrelevant to antitrust analysis. Drawing on the interconnected histories of antitrust and corporate law, this article makes the case for empowering corporate...

A reform movement is underway in antitrust. Citing prior enforcement failures, deviations from the original intent of the antitrust laws, and overall rising levels of sector concentration, some are seeking to fundamentally alter or altogether replace the current consumer welfare standard, which...

Antitrust law is undergoing a transformation that is detrimental to the interest of the general public. “Romantics” are taking over antitrust law—a fact evinced by recent public outreach instruments. This transformation is grounded in populist rhetoric that pits the “elites” (often,...

The idea of rewarding private parties who participate in the enforcement of public rules is not uncommon. Still, in the field of anti-cartel enforcement the policy of rewarding acts which are beneficial to the public is limited and typically takes the form of forgoing or reducing penalties under...

This paper investigates the design of a leniency policy to fight corporate crime. The manager may breach the law and report evidence to the authority. The shareholder writes the manager's incentive scheme and possibly reports evidence to the authority. The authority designs a leniency policy to...

Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on two types of penalties for deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and penalties against the agents of the violating firm. In this paper I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms. My area of application is antitrust, but the argument...

The treatment of innovation within the merger context by U.S. Antitrust Agencies continues to evolve, with regard to both general statements of enforcement policy and specific enforcement decisions. The respective merger guidelines issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade...