In this paper we look at motivation over time by setting up a dynamic contest model where winning the first contest yields an advantage in the second contest. The win advantage introduces an asymmetry into the competition that we find reduces the expected value to the contestants of being in the...

We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology (the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance to a subset of rivals. Allowing the non-license takers to remain active...

In this paper we look at motivation over time by setting up a dynamic contest model where winning the first contest yields an advantage in the second contest. The win advantage introduces an asymmetry into the competition that we find reduces the expected value to the contestants of being in the...

We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology (the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance to a subset of rivals. Allowing the non-license takers to remain active...