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When and how the punishment must fit the crime

Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - 2015

In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485538

Finitely repeated games with social preferences

Oechssler, Joerg - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008936286

Ranking friends

Kets, Willemien; Feinberg, Yossi - 2012

We investigate the scope for cooperation within a community engaged in repeated reciprocal interactions. Players seek the help of others and approach them sequentially according to some fixed order, that is, a ranking profile. We study the ranking profiles that are most effective in sustaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009684223

Stochastic adaption in finite games played by heterogeneous populations

Josephson, Jens (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001622442

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

McLean, Richard P. - 2011

We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are 'close' to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120591

Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2012

We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097801

Folk Theorems, Second Version

Compte, Olivier - 2013

Much of the repeated game literature is concerned with proving Folk Theorems. The logic of the exercise is to specify a particular game, and to explore for that game specification whether any given feasible (and individually rational) value vector can be an equilibrium outcome for some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081895

Infinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory : Four Perspectives on Discounting and Random Termination

Frechette, Guillaume R. - 2013

While infinitely repeated games with payoff discounting are theoretically isomorphic to randomly terminated repeated … games without payoff discounting, in practice, they correspond to very different environments. The standard method for … payoff discounting, followed by random termination (proposed by Cabral, Ozbay, and Schotter [2011]) or followed by a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086077

On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games

Horner, Johannes - 2013

This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori and Matsushima...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091590

Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Sugaya, Takuo - 2013

We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093673