A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an...

A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an...

We extend public goods game and design transboundary public goods game which players receive more information from the local group, and marginal return per capital (MPCR) is heterogeneous across local groups that high MPCR among local groups and low MPCR among counter groups. We experimentally...

While infinitely repeated games with payoff discounting are theoretically isomorphic to randomly terminated repeated games without payoff discounting, in practice, they correspond to very different environments. The standard method for implementing infinitely repeated games in the laboratory...

While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how %22the shadow of the future%22 affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. We simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab by having a random continuation rule. The...

We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a critical mass of players choose that action. We design a baseline version of the game in which payoffs remain constant for values above...

Recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that a component of Fischer (1935)’s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. The importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, but researchers’ incentives are not sufficient to encourage...