Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication promotes cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer the question how much communication is needed to sustain...

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...

Three kinds of activities happen in a network: agents link or unlink; agents act; agents observe and learn. The existing literature on network formation, on network games and on monitoring and learning in networks studies each of these in isolation. We propose a framework in which these happen...

This paper studies a novel setting in game theory: a player may learn new actions over time by observing the opponent's play. We investigate the impact of such learning behavior in the context of finitely repeated games. In contrast to related literature such as Kreps et al. (1982), we provide a...

We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types....

We revisit the classic model of two-player repeated games with undiscounted utility, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and further assume the informed player has state-independent preferences. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if...

This paper investigates the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in finitely repeated games. Each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions and chooses the action which has the highest assessment at each of his information sets. After receiving payoffs,...

This paper studies the interaction of beliefs, payoff parameters, and the cooperation rate in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We show formally that a player's belief about the probability of cooperation by their opponent moderates the effect of changes in the payoff parameters on...

This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov...

We propose an extension to smooth fictitious play and prove that play converges to an ε-Markov perfect equilibrium with probability one in a class of stochastic games known as Markov potential games. We then prove a partial Folk theorem for repeated games under one-period perfect monitoring. We...