This paper theoretically explores the voluntary provision of a public good in a finitely repeated setting. Agents' utility is the sum of their monetary earnings and a non-material psychological component that can be interpreted as a taste for efficiency and/or fairness. An arbitrarily small...

Game harmony is a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. It can be used to predict the relative degree of cooperation in games of different harmony. For a large enough increase...

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of...

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision gives all agents the possibility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all agents. In this experimental study the mechanism's performance is compared to the performance of the Voluntary...

The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a rich history in Economics and indeed in other social sciences like Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. Our research examines free...

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

We study how punishment influences conditional cooperation. We ask two questions: 1) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject can be punished and 2) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject has the power to punish others. In particular, we disentangle the decision to be a...

The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups affects efficiency and group stability. The paper expands on existing literature by assuming that each type can profitably mimic other types. It is shown...

We study theoretically and experimentally a two-person partnership game whereby agents only see the uncertain outcome of their joint effort but not how much the other agent contributed to it. The model combines problems of free-riding present in public good production and in teams with imperfect...