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We experimentally investigate how reputational concerns affect behavior in repeated Tullock contests by comparing expenditures of participants interacting in fixed groups with the expenditures of participants interacting with randomly changing opponents. When participants receive full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456852
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300885
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not … payoffs. Then, classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673067
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294404
relationship, which increases the temptation to behave opportunistically. However, we show that introducing a reputation mechanism … objective, long-lasting measure of reputation is the most effective in promoting cooperation, but short-lasting or subjective … but long-lasting reputation mechanisms also increase cooperative behavior. Moreover, reputation mechanisms generally lead …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028451
Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964745
The paper presents the results of a novel experiment testing the effects of environment complexity on strategic behavior, using a centipede game. Behavior in the centipede game has been explained either by appealing to failures of backward induction or by calling for preferences that induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291805
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of in finitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how “the shadow of the future” affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. We simulate in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games in the lab by having a random continuation rule....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318999