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Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network …'s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the … same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737090
We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat … significantly helps coordination, but only when subjects are pre-instructed to think of the wheel network as a reasonable way to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062154
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network …’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the … same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190075
This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108831
This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506562
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312355
This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319960
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012243769
connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219142
We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different … define two types of equilibria, namely the Repeated Nash Network (RNN), in which the same network forms at each period, and … given network may be implemented as a RNN. Then, we provide structural properties of RNE. For instance, players may form …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027059