We examine whether tax audits become more efficient if tax auditors have access to audited financial statements and information about statutory audit adjustments. We extend the standard tax compliance game by a statutory auditor to analyze the strategic interactions among a firm issuing...

Using a tax compliance game, we study whether the observability of the taxpayer's financial accounting information and the statutory auditor's report affects the tax compliance. We find that firms' responses differ significantly between private and public firms. Private firms compensate for the...

We examine whether tax audit regimes become more efficient if (i) there are audited financial statements and (ii) tax auditors have access to the internal statutory audit report revealing information about statutory audit adjustments. Our analysis is based on a standard tax compliance game that...

This study examines how a strategic tax auditor affects a multinational firm's transfer pricing in an incomplete information tax compliance game. Our model uses a divisionalized firm, in both a low-tax and a high-tax country, that decides to implement a transfer-pricing regime with either one or...

Transferpreise, Zweikreissystem, Einkreissystem, strategischer Steuerprüfer, Ausschreibungsprozess, strategisches Verhalten von Prüfungsgesellschaften, Prüfungsqualität, Verhaltensforschung in der Wirtschaftsprüfung, Verteilung der Prüfungsarbeit, Prüfungshonorare, Bilanzpolitik,...