In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a 'two-tier equilibrium' in which 'reputable' auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a "two-tier equilibrium" in which "reputable" auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...

In der Literatur zur Abschlußprüfung ist ein negativer Effekt eines ökonomischen Vorteils aus der wiederholten Mandatsannahme, der aufgrund von Transaktionskosten entsteht, auf die Unabhängigkeit des Abschlußprüfers diskutiert worden. Anders als die bisher vorgestellten Ansätze wird im...

The Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) has been examining financial reporting of companies listed in the regulated market in Germany since 1.7.2005. The paper analyzes the enforcement disclosure quality between 2006 and 2008 by comparing the published activity reports of the panel with...

We provide evidence on the long standing concern on auditor conflicts of interest from providing non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients by using rarely explored NAS fee data from 1978-80 Using this earlier setting, we find cross-sectional evidence of improved earnings quality when auditors...

The preparation, presentation, analysis, and interpretation of financial statements of an organization are major functions of the accounting system. This paper therefore, assesses the quality of auditor’s reports in the Nigerian Banking Industry, with a view to ascertaining the level of...

I argue that external financial reporting quality has at best a 2nd order effect on firm value of U.S. publicly traded companies and that attempts to improve a firm's external reporting quality has a 3rd order effect on these firms' value. Recognizing that external financial reporting quality is...

This paper analyzes the impact of agents' risk aversion and other agency parameters on optimal bias in the performance measures used for incentive contracts. Prior research has shown that the limited liability of the agent results in a demand for accounting systems that are stringent compared to...

We examine the effect of auditor conservatism on corporate innovation. We hypothesize that because conservative auditors constrain income-increasing accounting discretion, managers may sacrifice long-term investments in innovation to boost current earnings and meet short-term performance...

We examine how Big N auditors' changing incentives impact their comment-letter lobbying on U.S. GAAP over the first thirty-four years of the FASB (1973-2006). In particular, we focus on the influence of auditors' lobbying incentives arising from two basic factors: managing expected litigation...