Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty...

In this paper we try to explain why the misallocation of resources across different productive sectors tends to persist over time. We document that there is a link between the distribution of the public expenditure across sectors and the sectoral composition of an economy. We propose a general...

When the economic forecasts of public institutions deviate from actual outcomes, the deviations may not only be due to error but also to political intentions. A central bank, for example, may publish over-optimistic growth forecasts at the time of election to facilitate the re-election of the...

Using actual voting records of simultaneous elections held for Indian federal and regional assemblies -- where same political parties contest against each other in both type of elections -- we identify swing voters. We find that the representatives supported by swing voters outperform...

In this paper we study why the misallocation of resources across different productive sectors tends to persist over time. To this end we propose a general equilibrium model that delivers two structural relations. On the one hand, the public expenditure distribution influences the future sectoral...

Conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions or expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get re-elected, but this has not been tested in a large cross-section of countries. We test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. We find no evidence that deficits...