We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction new goods, whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our...

An analytical solution to the lab-equipment growth model (Rivera-Batiz and Romer,1991) with an exogenous imitation rate is presented and applied to study the policy tradeoff between weaker levels of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection yielding more consumption today, and stronger...

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction new goods, whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our...

We consider the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in a Schumpeterian growth model in which patent holders face the threats of profit loss due to imitation and complete replacement due to successful outside innovation. In this setting stronger IPR enforcement has both imitation and...