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professional and political party elites in command economies can serve as a good example of applied public good theory and should …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003973759
This paper studies the effects on electoral competition of political parties relying on monetary donations and volunteer labour for their electioneering activities. It also examines whether a recorded decline in party activism increases special-interest influence on party policy platforms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535105
bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude … or a modified form of quadratic voting. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824815
This paper studies when introducing verifiable communication choices between agents in a cheap-talk benchmark setting, with social tie, is beneficial to welfare. In our model agents have two ways to communicate their private information: either through a costly verifiable information (hard) link...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247925
This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971845
Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366546
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003676552
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519697
We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be … efficient central bankers in their bid to get re-elected. After re-election, however, losses will be lower when voting records … and can make central bankers individually accountable. Nevertheless, the negative effects of voting transparency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419080
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457902