In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...

In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...

In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...

This paper studies the impact of enhanced transparency on risk sharing opportunities in the foreign exchange market and the associated implications for ex ante welfare. Transparency is measured in this model by the informational content of publicly observable signals about exchange rate...

This paper studies the welfare effects of severalmonetary policy rules in the presence of anticipated and unanticipated oil price shocks. Our analysis is based on a stylized New Keynesian model of a small open economy. Our main findings are the following: i) Standard interest rate rules amplify...