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Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012

. -- corruption ; auctions ; negotiations ; public procurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689581

Corruption in procurement and the political cycle in tunneling : evidence from financial transactions data

Mironov, Maxim; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 8 (2016) 2, pp. 287-321

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011488928

Corruption in Public Procurement Auctions : Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, and Empirical Study

Wihardja, Maria Monica - 2009

We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first …-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders … and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720196

Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling : Evidence from Financial Transactions Data

Mironov, Maxim; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina - 2015

We provide evidence of corruption in allocation of public procurement and assess its efficiency. Firms with procurement … legitimate business of firms with procurement exhibits a political cycle. Data are consistent with the corruption channel - cash … strength of correlation between procurement revenue and tunneling around elections as a proxy for local corruption, we reject …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176400

Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism ; conference paper

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2013

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer s preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342227

Auctions vs. negotiations: The case of favoritism

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291548