quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own … quality, under comparative advertising a firm advertises the quality differential. In either scenario, under comparative … advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising. Moreover, under comparative …

, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may … scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non …-comparative advertising. -- advertising ; costly state falsification ; signalling …

We study firms' advertising strategies in an oligopolistic market in which both non-comparative and comparative … advertising are present. We show that in equilibrium firms mix over the two types of advertising, with the intensity of … comparative advertising exceeding that of non-comparative advertising; moreover, that the intensity of comparative increases …

, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may … scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non …-comparative advertising. …

, accounting for multi-homing helps to recognize complementarity between products; on the advertising side, it allows to measure to … what extent advertising demand depends on the shares of exclusive and overlapping readers. …

, accounting for multi-homing helps to recognize complementarity between products; on the advertising side, it allows to measure to … what extent advertising demand depends on the shares of exclusive and overlapping readers. …