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Trading votes for votes, a decentralized matching algorithm

Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398496

Trading votes for votes : a decentralized matching algorithm

Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416102

Trading votes for votes : a decentralized matching algorithm

Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011556501

Trading votes for votes : a dynamic theory

Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R. - Columbia University / Department of Economics - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012056273

Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm

Casella, Alessandra - 2015

allocation achieved via sequential pairwise trades, but lends only weak support to the dynamic algorithm itself … three central questions that have parallels in the matching literature: (1) Does a stable allocation of votes always exists …? (2) Is it reachable through a decentralized algorithm? (3) What welfare properties does it possess? We prove that a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013013510

Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm

Casella, Alessandra - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457024

Welfare in models of trade with heterogeneous firms

Janiak, Alexandre (contributor) - 2008

I illustrate that the welfare improvement property of the Melitz model is due to the shape of the aggregate labor demand curve, which slopes upwards. By slightly changing some assumptions in the model, this curve may have a negative slope. In this case, increases in aggregate productivity result...