Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information...

Merit and justice / Amartya Sen -- Equality of opportunity / John E. Roemer -- IQ trends over time: intelligence, race, and meritocracy / James R. Flynn -- Genes, culture, and inequality / Marcus W. Feldman, Sarah P. Otto, and Freddy B. Christiansen -- Schooling, intelligence, and income in...

In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (i) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into...

Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority- delegation game. Individuals often retain...