. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

authorities after January 1990. The median cartel had five corporate members and generated $1.2 billion in sales during the … penalties, if imposed at maximum levels, would extract about 12 times cartel overcharges, a level sufficient to deter most firms … from forming or joining a cartel. However, applying optimal deterrence concepts to the characteristics of modern …

. We show that a social planner would further restrict trade than the perfect cartel would, and how the socially optimal …

market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a cost, from the foreign firm. Under some circumstances, a perfect cartel …

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical …-reporting by cartel members …

Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly … direct test of the optimal deterrence theory of antitrust crimes. Regressions are fitted to a sample of the corporations that …-deterrence model is quite good. We find that U.S. corporate cartel fines are strongly directly related to economic injuries from …

other modern cartel. For example, the internal records of the major defendants have yielded monthly transaction prices for …