We analyze the optimal design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that compensate foreign investors against host country policies. Optimal agreements cause national but not global underregulation...

This paper investigates the design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that protect foreign investment against host country policies. We show that optimal agreements cause national but not global...

This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome may prevail independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A lighthanded regulatory policy can...

I analyze renewable electricity policy in a multinational electricity market with transmission investment. If national policy makers choose support schemes to maximize domestic welfare, then a trade policy motive arises operating independently of any direct benefit of renewable electricity. The...

International investment agreements typically permit foreign investors to litigate against host countries (Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ISDS). Yet, common criticism holds that host countries would benefit from allowing only foreign governments to litigate (State-State Dispute Settlement,...