This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Two politicoeconomic equilibria arise from our model, one with little protection of insiders on capital and labor markets, and another one with...

Using data on a panel of 56 democratic countries in the period 1975-2004, we find evidence of a negative association between political stability and economic growth which is stronger and empirically more robust in countries with high bureaucratic costs. Motivated by these results, which contrast...

This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Two politicoeconomic equilibria arise from our model, one with little protection of insiders on capital and labor markets, and another one with...

Kleine Länder sind außenwirtschaftlich verwundbarer als große Länder und deshalb sind sie zur flexiblen Anpassung an weltwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen gezwungen. Dies setzt voraus, dass sie innenpolitisch diese Anpassungsprozesse realisieren können. Eine wichtige Voraussetzung hierfür ist...