A stock replenishing model is considered whereby not only the demand for the item, but also the stock in hand and the lead time period are considered to be random variables. The interrelations of these three item characteristics are then studied in the framework of a scheme for deciding when to...

Richer and more educated citizens demand better governance than poorer citizens. They participate more in the political process, are more difficult to buy off, and tend to have the financial resources to support a revolt. An autocrat who is politically insecure may therefore not invest in...

In this paper, a probability model leading to a Yule distribution is developed in the study of surname frequency data. This distribution, suitably truncated, is fitted to actual data as an alternative to the discrete Pareto distribution, with quite satisfactory results

The problem of determining how family names evolve preoccupies both statistics and human biology. The determination of a proper and well justified probability model to describe the probability distribution of surnames has been confronted by many authors. In this paper two stochastic models...

We suggest a dynamic game theoretic model to explain why resource abundance may lead to instability of democracy. Stationary Markov perfect equilibria of this game with four players – Politician, Oligarch, Autocrat and Public (voters) – are analyzed. Choosing a rate of resource rent tax,...

We analyze data on sustainability of democratic regimes in resource rich countries and suggest a two-period model to explain why resource abundance may lead to instability of democracy in some countries, but does not create any difficulties for democratic system in other ones. Our central idea...

In our previous papers (Polterovich V., Popov V., 2007; Polterovich V., Popov V., Tonis A., 2006) it was shown that democratization (increase in the political rights index of the Freedom house in 1970-2000) can negatively affect economic growth, if the quality of institutions at the beginning of the...

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between...

I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play a passive role. The autocrat determines the...