This paper examines the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers have uncertain valuations. This uncertainty can only be resolved after the actual transactions take place and upon incurring significant post-purchase cost. We focus on two different settings regarding how the seller values a...

We analyze data from experimental auctions of orange maize in rural Zambia using the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to estimate the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the maize. Further, BDM data is combined with first-price auction data to estimate individual risk attitudes. The orange maize...

Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in...

This paper explores whether a truth-telling promise can work to reduce the hypothetical bias in preference elicitation. Using an induced value experiment in China with a random nth-price auction, the author finds: 1) Hypothetical bias exists in a random nth-price auction with induced values and...

This research examines how the intensity of the dynamic competitive interaction with other bidders in ascending auctions influences consumers' willingness to pay for auctioned products. It focuses on one important aspect of this interaction – the speed of competitor reaction. The key...

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that...

In online commerce, a buyer cannot directly examine the product and has to rely heavily on the reliability of the seller. In this setting, the reputation of the seller, together with any other information signals on the quality of the product, can play an important role in determining the...

It is generally thought that market outcomes are improved with the provision of market information. As a result, the use of repeated rounds with price feedback has become standard practice in the applied experimental auction valuation literature.We conducted two experiments to determine how...

Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in...