We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when the general public is unsure about central bankers' efficiency and central bankers are aiming for re-election. We show that publication is initially harmful since...

This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...

We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when the general public is unsure about central bankers' efficiency and central bankers are aiming for re-election. We show that publication is initially harmful since...

This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...

We suggest that flexible majority rules for currency issuance decisions foster the stability of a cryptocurrency. With flexible majority rules, the voteshare needed to approve a particular currency issuance growth is increasing with this growth rate. By choosing suitable parameters for these...