We examine the economic consequences of an interest-bearing design of the Central-Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), and extend the discussion to an open-economy context with trade and capital flows. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to simulate a baseline scenario with...

Central banks around the world are examining the possibility of introducing Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). The public’s preferences concerning the usage of CBDC for paying and saving are important determinants of the success of CBDC. Using data from a representative panel of Dutch...

How does the transmission of monetary policy change when a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is introduced in the economy? Do aspects of CBDC design, such as how substitutable it is with bank deposits and whether it is interest bearing, matter? We study these questions in a general...

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

We study the effect of collateral eligibility of corporate loans on the pricing of these loans by banks in Finland. Speciftcally, we investigate whether loans that are pledgeable as collateral for central bank borrowing have lower liquidity premia and thus lower interest rates. For...

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) enable negative interest rates. A game is analyzed between a central bank (accounting for the government’s interest) and a representative household choosing to consume, hold CBDC, or hold non-CBDC. The central bank chooses negative interest rate when it...