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Equilibrium formation of class action suits
Che, Yeon-Koo - In: Journal of public economics 62 (1996) 3, pp. 339-361
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001208429
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Decoupling liability : optimal incentives for care and litigation
Polinsky, Alan Mitchell; Che, Yeon-Koo - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000811719
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Optimal use of information in litigation : should regulatory information be withheld to deter frivolous suits?
Che, Yeon-Koo; Earnhart, Dietrich - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000931442
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Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement : divide and conquer
Che, Yeon-Koo; Spier, Kathryn E. - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 164 (2008) 1, pp. 4-23
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003665201
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Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement : divide and conquer: comment
Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 164 (2008) 1, pp. 24-26
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666801
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Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement : divide and conquer: comment
Stremitzer, Alexander - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 164 (2008) 1, pp. 27-30
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666809
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Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement : divide and conquer
Che, Yeon-Koo; Spier, Kathryn E. - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003600909
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Exploiting plaintiffs through settlement : divide and conquer
Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Spier, Kathryn E. (contributor) - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003729762
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Decoupling Liability : Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 1991
A "decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475381
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Decoupling Liability : Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Che, Yeon-Koo - 2021
A "decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224692