Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast `yes' or `no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as `yes' or `no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to...

We modify the story behind the Shapley-Shubik power index and apply it to a legislative body. The resulting proportional index may be trivial, but is free from the paradoxical behaviour observable with standard power indices. The widespread use of this index may in fact be the reason for these...

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model...

Qualified majority voting is used when decisions are made by voters of different sizes. In such situations the voters' influence on decision making is far from obvious; power measures are used for an indication of the decision making ability. Several power measures have been proposed and...

While they use the language of game theory the known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave dierently from the indices' predictions and...

The European Union used to make decisions by unanimity or near unanimity. After a series of extensions, with 27 member states the present decision making mechanisms have become very slow and assigned power to the members in an arbitrary way. The new decision rules accepted as part of the Lisbon...

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

The possible exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will have profound economic and political effects. Here we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Since the Lisbon treaty the exit does not require new negotiations as the success...

The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union has had profound economic and political effects. Here, we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Using the Shapley-Shubik power index, we calculate the member states' powers with and without...

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the in-dices predictions and propose a...